題目： Retailer Information Sharing with Supplier Encroachment
主講人： 關旭
時間：2017年12月14日下午14:30
地點：主樓317室
主講人介紹：
武漢大學經濟與偉德國際1946bv官網管理科學與工程系教授，管理學博士。目前研究興趣包括信息不對稱環境下的供應鏈管理及收益管理。近5年來在Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics, Decision Support System, Omega, Transportation Research Part E, International Journal of Production Economics, Annals of Operations Research, International Journal of Production Research發表10余篇論文。
內容介紹：
This paper investigates a retailer's incentive for sharing private demand information with a supplier who may encroach the retail channel by imposing a fixed entry cost. Although conventional wisdom suggests that a retailer should withhold her private demand observations to maintain an information advantage over the supplier, we obtain a different conclusion by demonstrating that the retailer may prefer to voluntarily share the demand information in anticipation of supplier encroachment. The intuition is that in face of the threat of supplier encroachment, sharing low demand information may prevent the supplier from establishing a direct selling channel, which will reduce downstream channel competition. This strategic effect of information sharing is new and only becomes dominant when there is an intermediate entry cost for encroachment and a high channel substitution rate. In contrast, when there are deviations from these conditions, the supplier's equilibrium encroachment decision is consistent and irrespective of the retailer's decision to share information, which makes withholding the demand information more beneficial to the retailer. The change of information sharing structure in the channel also leads to some unintended payoff implications, as the supplier's and channel's payoffs exhibit non-monotonic relations to the entry cost or channel substitution rate.
（承辦：技術經濟及管理系，科研與學術交流中心）
